NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. *See* Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

FILED BY CLERK

MAY 18 2010

COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,) 2 CA-CR 2009-0224
) DEPARTMENT A
Appellee,)
) <u>MEMORANDUM DECISION</u>
v.) Not for Publication
) Rule 111, Rules of
WILLIAM FREDRICK YORK, JR.,) the Supreme Court
Appellant.	
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR	R COURT OF PIMA COUNTY
Cause No. CR	-2008-3913
Honorable John L	eonardo, Judge
AFFIR	MED
Wanda K. Day	Tucson
	Attorney for Appellant

KELLY, Judge.

Following a jury trial, William Fredrick York, Jr. was convicted of theft of a means of transportation. The trial court found he had one historical prior felony conviction and sentenced him to a mitigated, enhanced prison term of four years. York appealed, and counsel has filed a brief in compliance with *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and *State v. Clark*, 196 Ariz. 530, 2 P.3d 89 (1999), avowing she has 'thoroughly reviewed the Record on Appeal and reporter's transcripts and has found no

arguable issues' to raise. She asks this court to search the record for reversible error.

York has not filed a supplemental brief.

Pursuant to our obligation under *Anders*, we have reviewed the record and

found no error warranting reversal. Viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the

jury's verdict, see State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 246, ¶ 2, 98 P.2d 914, 914 (App. 1999), the

evidence established that the victim's motorcycle had been stolen on the first or second

day of September, 2008. Sheriffs deputies located the motorcycle approximately two

weeks later, parked outside of York's residence/business. The motorcycle had "very

obvious ignition damage and was secured with a master lock, the key to which was found

hanging from York's belt. The motorcycle's ignition had been undamaged when the

victim had last seen it on September 1.

A person commits theft of a means of transportation by "[c]ontrol[ing]

another person's means of transportation knowing or having reason to know that the

property is stolen." A.R.S. § 13-1814(A)(5). Sufficient evidence supported the jury's

verdict as well as the court's determination that York had a historical prior felony

conviction. The sentence the court imposed was within the statutory range for York's

offense. Therefore, we affirm the conviction and the sentence imposed.

/s/ Virginia C. Kelly
VIRGINIA C. KELLY, Judge

CONCURRING:

/s/ Joseph W. Howard

JOSEPH W. HOWARD, Chief Judge

/s/ Philip G. Espinosa

PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Presiding Judge

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